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INTENTIONAL WAIVERS OF PRIVILEGE AND
THE OPINION OF COUNSEL: CAN THE SCOPE OF
DISCLOSURE BE MANAGED?
Amy L. Landerst
In any given patent dispute, the protections afforded by the
attorney-client privilege and work product doctrines are foundational
assumptions when documentation is created and client
communications take place. The purpose of each doctrine is to
encourage "full and frank communication" between lawyer and
client,' and afford attorneys the opportunity to permit thorough trial
preparation without the fear that such material will become available
to opposing counsel through discovery. 2 Therefore, memorandum, e-
mails and transcribed voicemails often contain sensitive information
created based on the parties' belief that the sensitive information will
not become available to opposing counsel. However, when creating
such sensitive documentation, attorneys may not always carefully
consider the fact that the sensitive material may later be displayed-
larger than life-to a jury examining whether their client has engaged
in willful patent infringement.
At first blush, it may be difficult to conceive of circumstances
under which such protections would be voluntarily waived. However,
an accused infringer seeking to rely on an "advice of counsel" defense
to a charge of willful infringement may choose to do so as a necessary
price to pay to obtain the benefits of an advice of counsel defense.
Generally, prior to invoking an advice of counsel defense, a client
will engage opinion counsel, who is asked to consider the patent
claims and the potentially infringing process, method or device, and
t Ms. Landers is a partner in the Silicon Valley office ofOrrick Herrington & Sutcliffe
LLP. This article does not express the views of Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP, their
lawyers and clients of those lawyers. This article is for informational purposes only and does
not constitute, and should not be construed as constituting, legal advice.
I. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) ("The privilege recognizes
that sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy
depends upon the lawyer's being fully informed by the client.").
2. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1947) ("In performing his various duties,
however, it is essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy, free from
unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel.").
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to provide an independent, informed legal opinion as to whether
infringement has occurred or whether the patent will likely be held
valid and enforceable. If the client has exercised diligence in
obtaining a competent, independent and informed opinion of counsel
indicating that there is no infringement and/or that the patent is
invalid or unenforceable, the client may then assert good faith
reliance on counsel's opinion when the patent-holder claims that the
allegedly infringing activity is willful. According to the courts, a
patent holder's good faith reliance on an opinion of counsel
constitutes important evidence that an infringement was not "willful."
After litigation commences and the alleged infringer decides to
rely on an opinion of counsel defense, the alleged infringer must then
produce the opinion of counsel to opposing counsel. Established
precedent holds that the "deliberate injection of the advice of counsel
defense into a case waives the attorney-client privilege." 3 The issue
then becomes the court's determination of the scope of the waiver.
Does the waiver of attorney-client privilege extend solely to counsel's
opinion? Does it include all communications with the client
concerning the opinion? Does the waiver extend to trial counsel? Is
the protection afforded to work product created in anticipation of
litigation, such as trial strategy memoranda, also waived? Answers to
these questions can be found in a number of district court decisions,
each of which evidence the court's increasingly fractionalized view
on the scope of waiver. In fact, even trial courts within the same
district have reached strikingly different results.4 To make matters
worse, the Federal Circuit has yet to provide any definitive ruling on
the issue.5
Once litigation commences and the advice of counsel defense is
invoked, rarely are agreements on the scope of waiver of privilege
reached between the parties because patent holders typically have
little incentive to agree to anything less than the fullest disclosure
permitted by law. The potential to mine the alleged infringer's files
3. Nitinol Med. Techs., Inc. v. AGA Med. Corp., 135 F. Supp. 2d 212, 217 (D. Mass.
2000).
4. See Mosel Vitelic Corp. v. Micron Technology, Inc., 162 F. Supp. 2d 307, 311 (D.
Del. 2000) (rejecting analysis of another district court within the same district as to the
discoverability of draft opinions, stating "while the opinion of one district judge may be found
to be persuasive, it is not binding on another district judge (even if that judge happens to sit in
the same district)").
5. Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 179 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1186 (E.D. Cal. 2001)
("[Tihe Federal Circuit has been silent on the discovery issue of the extent of attorney-
client/work product waiver primarily because such discovery issues have not surfaced in post-
trial appeals to the knowledge of the parties or the undersigned").
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in the hopes of obtaining a glimpse into its trial strategy or of
discovering a "smoking gun" admission that would eliminate or
substantially impair the alleged infringer's defenses at trial creates a
powerful incentive to hold out for maximum disclosure. On the other
hand, alleged infringers will fight to keep the scope of the waived
privileged information as narrow as possible. However, where the
accused infringer has retained the same counsel for both opinion work
and trial, trial strategy memoranda may be particularly at risk for
production to the opponent.
Two recent district court decisions, Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. E'lite
6 7Optik, Inc.,6 and BASF Aktiengesellschaft v. Reilly Industries, Inc.,
demonstrate the courts' difficulty in arriving at a uniform position on
the scope of waiver and uncertainty facing patent holders and their
counsel. Aspex Eyewear and BASF both illustrate the courts'
willingness to examine the specific facts and circumstances of each
case when determining the scope of the waiver. Because the scope of
the waiver question depends on the circumstances present in a
particular case, both Aspex Eyewear and BASF demonstrate a
troublesome lack of predictability for those involved in drafting
opinions of counsel.
Given the uncertainty as to whether information held or obtained
by opinion counsel will ultimately become discoverable by opposing
counsel and admissible at trial, counsel preparing an opinion must
exercise great care.8 This challenge is especially difficult, given that
as a temporal matter, an opinion is typically generated well in
advance9 of a court's determination of the precise scope of the waiver
in any particular case. Because of the possibility that the court might
compel a broad scope of disclosure that may contain damaging
admissions, additional consideration must be given to whether to
proffer the advice of counsel opinion after litigation has commenced.
BASF and Aspex Eyewear illustrate the risks inherent in relying
on an opinion of counsel at trial and provide lessons to those accused
6. 276 F. Supp. 2d 1084 (D. Nev. 2003).
7. 283 F. Supp. 2d 1000 (S.D. Ind. 2003).
8. Destruction of such documents once created may, under some case authority, open
the door to sanctions. See generally Mosel Vitelic Corp., 162 F. Supp. 2d at 313.
9. According to some Federal Circuit case law, an opinion should be drafted before the
initiation of infringing activity. Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d
1380, 1390 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that a client could not reasonably rely on written opinion
received long after infringement and notice of the patent had been provided). As a practical
matter, this may be well before litigation commences and long before the district court
determines the scope of the waiver in a particular case.
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of patent infringement and their counsel. As both courts found, the
scope of the waiver rests to some degree in the hands of the accused
infringer and their counsel. Thus, reviewing these decisions is helpful
to those involved patent disputes in which the patent holder may
become accused of willful patent infringement.
I. THE ROLE OF AN OPINION OF COUNSEL IN DEFENDING AGAINST A
WILLFULNESS CLAIM.
A brief overview of the law of willful infringement and the
relevance of opinions of counsel sheds light on the backdrop against
which these battles are fought. The Federal Circuit has held that
patent law imposes an affirmative duty of care to avoid infringement
of the known patent rights of others.' 0 An infringer may breach this
duty by engaging in infringing activity in disregard of a patent
without a reasonable basis for believing they have a right to do so.II
The stakes for establishing or avoiding a finding of willfulness may
be high because where willfulness is established, a patentee may
obtain up to three times the damages amount, 12 as well as the patent
holder's attorney fees.
13
Whether an infringer has acted willfully depends on an
examination of the infringer's state of mind.14 Alleged infringers may
defend against a willfulness charge by asserting good faith, justifiable
reliance on a competent opinion of counsel stating that the patent
10. See, e.g., Comark Communications, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1190 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) ("As a general matter, a potential infringer with actual notice of another's patent has
an affirmative duty of due care that usually requires the potential infringer to obtain competent
legal advice before engaging in any activity that could infringe another's patent rights").
11. See Am. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Med. Eng'g Corp., 6 F.3d 1523, 1531 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("A
finding of willfulness requires the fact-finder to find that clear and convincing evidence shows
'that the infringer acted in disregard of the patent... [and] had no reasonable basis for believing
it had a right to do the acts." (quoting Stickle v. Heublein, Inc., 716 F.2d 1550, 1565 (Fed. Cir.
1983)).
12. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2002) (authorizing the court to increase the damages up to three
times the amount found or assessed). See also Modine Mfg Co. v. Allen Group, Inc., 917 F.2d
538, 543 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ("The decision to increase damages is committed to the discretion of
the trial judge .... ")
13. The Patent Act provides that "[tihe court in exceptional cases may award reasonable
attorney fees to the prevailing party." 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2002).
14. Mahurkar v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 79 F.3d 1572, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1996) ("Whether an
infringer acted willfully is a question of fact that rests on a determination of the infringer's state
of mind."); see also Underwater Devices, 717 F.2d at 1390 ("A potential infringer has 'an
affirmative duty' to seek and obtain competent legal advice from counsel before the initiation of
any infringing activity.").
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holder's rights either not infringed, invalid, unenforceable, or some
combination of these.
15
The test for determining whether an opinion of counsel is
competent and adequate is whether the legal advice contained in the
opinion of non-infringement is, under the totality of the
circumstances, sufficient such that the client was reasonable in relying
on it. 6  The significance of obtaining an opinion of counsel is
underscored by the Federal Circuit's determination that the jury may
draw an adverse, albeit rebuttable, inference of willfulness from the
defendant's failure to provide a competent opinion of counsel.' 7 As
explained in Electro Medical Systems, S.A. v. Cooper Life Sciences,
Inc.,18 "when an infringer refuses to produce an exculpatory opinion
of counsel in response to a charge of willful infringement, an
inference may be drawn that either no opinion was obtained or, if an
opinion was obtained, it was unfavorable."' 9 Although the Federal
Circuit's view on this adverse inference is subject to change,2 ° the
incentives for defendants to obtain and rely on an opinion of counsel
as evidence of good faith in order to avoid the possibility of paying
both treble damages and their opponent's attorney fees are likely to
remain.
II. THE SCOPE OF THE WAIVER OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE AND WORK-PRODUCT PROTECTION
Although there is no question that there is a waiver of privilege
when an opinion of counsel defense is asserted, there is considerable
disagreement on the scope of the waiver. Some district courts require
discovery only to the extent that the information has been actually
15. Mahurkar, 79 F.3d at 1579.
16. Sri Int'l, Inc. v. Advanced Tech. Labs., 127 F.3d 1462, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("When
this defense is raised the court may consider the nature of the advice, the thoroughness and
competence of the legal opinion presented, and its objectivity.").
17. See Underwater Devices, 717 F.2d at 1390.
18. 34 F.3d 1048 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
19. Id. at 1056; see also Paper Converting Mach. Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d
11, 20 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
20. Although the Federal Circuit has permitted this adverse inference for approximately
two decades, the continued viability of the doctrines is presently uncertain. Recently, the
Federal Circuit has sua sponte granted en bane review in Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer
Nutzfahrzeuge GMBH v. Dana Corporation. In Knorr-Bremse, the Federal Circuit requested
briefing of whether it is "appropriate to draw an adverse inference with respect to willful
infringement." 344 F.3d 1336, 1336-37 (Fed. Cir. 2003). The Federal Circuit also requested
briefing on the questions of: 1) whether the adverse inference was appropriate when the
attorney-client privilege and/or work product privileges were invoked; and 2) the application of
any change in the current state of the law to the facts of the Knorr-Bremse case. Id.
770 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.. [Vol. 20
disclosed to the client. These courts base their reasoning on
substantive patent law, which examines willfulness by analyzing the
client's state of mind to determine whether reliance on the opinion of
counsel was reasonable. 21  For example, in Thorn EMI North
America, Inc. v. Micron Technology, Inc.,22 the court determined that
work product that had never been disclosed to the client was not
discoverable, reasoning:
The facts of consequence to the determination of a claim of willful
infringement relate to the infringer's state of mind. Counsel's
mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories are not
probative of that state of mind unless they have been
23communicated to that client.
However, other district courts take a more expansive view of the
information that must be produced, requiring production of all
attorney-client and work product generated or relied upon by opinion
counsel. These courts reason that "fundamental fairness" requires
that such documents be produced to test the alleged infringer's
positions, the basis and competency of the opinion and the
reasonableness of the alleged infringer's reliance on the opinion. For
example, in Electro Scientific Industries, Inc. v. General Scanning,
Inc.,24 the court drew the inference that the possibility of
inconsistencies in an attorney's files-whether communicated to the
client or not-was a sufficient grounds to establish the relevance and
discoverability of such documents, stating:
It is possible that documents in opinion counsel's work product file
could reflect very different analyses and conclusions than were set
forth in the one disclosed [opinion] letter. The fact that the
analyses and conclusions in the lawyer's private file were clearly at
odds with the content of the disclosed opinion would tend to
support an inference that there were additional communications
between client and counsel and that in those communications the
21. See, e.g., Micron Separations, Inc. v. Pall Corp., 159 F.R.D. 361, 363 (D. Mass.
1995); Steelcase, Inc. v. Haworth, 954 F. Supp. 1195, 1198 (W.D. Mich. 1997) ("[T]he
infringer's 'intent and reasonable beliefs are the primary focus of the willful infringement
inquiry"'(quoting Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Smith, 959 F.2d 936, 944 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). Indeed,
the Steelcase court held that discovery addressed to the "legal correctness" of the opinion was
irrelevant. Id. at 1199.
22. 837 F. Supp. 616 (D. Del. 1993).
23. Id. at 622.
24. 175 F.R.D. 539 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
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client received opinions that were not consistent with the views
expressed in the disclosed letter.
25
Further splits of authority exist as to whether material generated
after litigation commences should be treated differently than pre-
litigation material. Although some courts hold that post-litigation
material should be treated no differently and is thus discoverable,26
other courts limit disclosure to only communications and documents
created prior to the commencement of the lawsuit, permitting greater
protection for litigation work-product. 2
7
It is against this backdrop that clients and counsel must make
their daily decisions-the significance of which may not become
known until years down the road when both are embroiled in
litigation. Therefore, awareness of critical points and decisions, as
illustrated in Aspex Eyewear and BASF, provide some useful
guidelines for the issues that must be considered when such decisions
are made.
III. ASPEXEYEWEAR, INC. v. E'LITE OPTIK, INC.: OPINION COUNSEL IN
DUAL ROLES AND THE EXPANDED SCOPE OF WAIVER
In Aspex Eyewear, Inc. v. E'lite Optik, Inc., the court considered
a plaintiff patent-holder's motion to compel production of documents
after the defendant asserted good faith reliance on two opinions of
counsel, each drafted by a different attorney. 28 Each opinion counsel
had undertaken at least two roles for the defendant. The first opinion
counsel provided the defendant with an oral opinion, and he was also
defendant's former trial counsel in the litigation.29 However, this first
opinion counsel could not recall what information had been
25. Id. at 545.
26. See, e.g., Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 179 F. Supp. 1182, 1188 (E.D. Cal. 2001)
("While there is some authority that cuts off the waiver at the time of the filing of the action, the
better authority requires that all communications, both pre and post-complaint filing, should be
disclosed.") (emphasis in original). The Chiron court relied in part of the fact that the defendant
continued to engage in the conduct that was accused of infringement. "Therefore, [the
defendant]'s state of mind throughout the trial, i.e., the reasonableness of its reliance on the
advice of counsel, is pertinent throughout the litigation." Id.
27. Dunhall Pharms., Inc. v. Discus Dental, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1202, 1205-06 (C.D. Cal.
1998) (balancing the plaintiff's need for discovery against the defendant's interest in protecting
work product and finding that "[a]lthough defendants have waived work product protection by
asserting the advice of counsel defense, that waiver is not absolute" and "[o]nce the lawsuit is
filed, the waiver of work product protection ends.").
28. 276 F. Supp. 2d 1084 (D. Nev. 2003).
29. Id. at 1086.
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transmitted to the client.3 ° Defendant's second opinion counsel had
been also designated as an expert witness in the case.3'
As for the oral opinion of counsel, Aspex Eyewear held that
fairness required disclosure of all documents that the attorney had
reviewed, considered or authored relating to infringement, validity or
enforceability of the patent. The court reasoned:
By designating its former litigation counsel as a witness to support
its advice of counsel defense, [the defendant] has waived the
attorney-client privilege as to all of [its counsel]'s communications
and documents relating to the advice he rendered on infringement,
validity and enforceability of the Patents-in-suit .... Without
discovery of his work product, plaintiffs will be unable to ascertain
the basis and facts upon which his opinions are based and will be
impaired in their ability to effectively cross-examine on these
critical issues.
32
This holding broadened the scope of discovery to include all
communications between client and counsel concerning patent issues,
regardless of whether or not such issues directly concerned the
opinion. The Aspex Eyewear court then went further, requiring
disclosure of material generated after the litigation had commenced.
Acknowledging that the court "would ordinarily be inclined to impose
a temporal limitation on the waiver at the point the lawsuit was filed
in the absence of the allegation that the defendant's willful
infringement was ongoing,"33 Aspex Eyewear found the waiver had a
broader temporal scope. Specifically, the court determined that the
oral opinion's lack of specificity, counsel's inability to recall what
was reviewed and the basis of his opinions justified permitting the
plaintiff more leeway into the willfulness, infringement, validity and
enforceability of the disputed patents. 34 However, the court stopped
short of requiring the defendant to produce materials generated by the
defendant's current litigation counsel. 35
As for the second opinion drafted by the attorney, later
designated as an expert witness, Aspex Eyewear held that the
defendant had waived the attorney-client privilege for all
communications and documents relating to any advice concerning
30. Id. at 1087.
31. Id. at 1086.
32. Id. at 1096.
33. Id. at 1095.
34. Aspex Eyewear, 276 F. Supp. at 1095-96.
35. Id.
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patent infringement, validity or enforceability regardless of whether
such information had been communicated to the defendant.36 This
portion of the Aspex Eyewear opinion is consistent with the weight of
existing authority, which holds that all materials relied up or
considered by testifying experts are discoverable.
37
The breadth of disclosure required by Aspex Eyewear is
significant to both those obtaining an opinion of counsel and to those
involved in patent litigation in which willfulness is asserted.
Fundamentally, the Aspex Eyewear court was persuaded by the
reasoning set forth in the line of cases broadening the scope of
waiver. In addition, Aspex Eyewear scrutinized the defendant's
actions and broadened the scope of discoverable documents based on
the roles that both opinion counsel had undertaken. Further, the
Aspex Eyewear court essentially concluded the defendant bore the
brunt of its counsel's inability to recall and separate which material
had and had not been communicated to the client and compelled the
defendant to produce a broader range of otherwise protected material.
In asking opinion counsel to perform additional tasks,
particularly tasks in which sensitive information may be conveyed, a
careful assessment should be made of the possibility that documents
and information exchanged in all relationships relating to counsel's
opinion may become discoverable. Despite the economic efficiencies
of exploiting counsel's familiarity with a particular patent and/or
infringement scenario by asking counsel to take on multiple roles in
the dispute, increasing the scope of counsel's representation will
likely increase the type and quantity of harmful documentation and
information that may later be compelled for disclosure. 38  Further,
communications between opinion and trial counsel should be
curtailed to minimize the risk that trial counsel's files may become
discoverable.
36. Id. at 1096.
37. In re Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 238 F.3d 1370, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (" [T]he 1993
amendments to the Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure make clear that documents
and information disclosed to a testifying expert in connection with his testimony are
discoverable by the opposing party, whether or not the expert relies on the documents and
information in preparing his report.").
38. The additional risk of disqualification of trial counsel should also be considered. See
Rohm and Hass Co. v. Lonza, Inc., 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13919 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (entering
disqualification order for trial counsel who had authored a written opinion, based on state rules
of professional conduct which prohibited trial counsel from testifying before a jury); but see
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 55 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1662 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(denying motion to disqualify opinion counsel).
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Communications between the opinion counsel and the client
should be carefully catalogued, so that material that had been
disclosed to the client may be readily identified. Such a catalogue
may create a persuasive record that only certain material must be
disclosed and that, ultimately, the scope of discoverable documents
should be narrow. Additionally, as Aspex Eyewear points out, careful
examination of all work product and attorney client communications
should be performed before the decision is made to disclose an
opinion counsel as a testifying expert witness.
IV. BASF AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT V. REILLYINDUSTRIES, INC.: OPINION
COUNSEL'S DUAL ROLE AND INCONSISTENT POSITIONS.
In BASF Aktiengesellschaft v. Reilly Industries, Inc., ("BASF"),
the court considered the scope of production required after the
defendant disclosed a written opinion of counsel. 39 The breadth of the
plaintiff patent holder's request encompassed all documlients,
regardless of when such documents were created and regardless of
whether such documents had been sent to the client.40 Because the
defendant retained the same lawyers for the written opinion and for
trial,4 ' as a practical matter the plaintiffs request sought trial
counsel's internal notes and memoranda regarding at least portions of
the litigation defense. The potential impact of the plaintiffs request
was likely to have placed at least some significant documents at risk,
such as trial strategy or analysis regarding perceived weaknesses in
the defense's case. As the defendant argued in the BASF case, the
plaintiff's request threatened to "needlessly and unfairly interfere with
trial counsel's defense of the lawsuit, and might even create an
'ethical dilemma' whereby trial counsel might be drawn into being a
material witness."
42
The plaintiff argued that full disclosure of defense counsel's files
was necessary because such documents were "highly relevant to the
issue of competency and, in turn, the reasonableness of the reliance
on that opinion. ' 43 Significantly, the plaintiff also established that the
39. 283 F. Supp. 2d 1000 (S.D. Ind. 2003).
40. Id. at 1002.
41. Id. at 1003.
42. Id. at 1002.
43. Id. at 1004. This argument is consistent with some courts' view that work product
that has never been communicated to a client is discoverable as relevant to the competence of
the opinion and, therefore, the reasonableness of the client's reliance on the opinion of counsel.
See, e.g., Novartis Pharms. Corp. v. Eon Labs Mfg., Inc., 206 F.R.D. 396 (D. Del. 2002). The
court in Norvartis relied on an analysis of the waiver doctrine in addition to reasoning that the
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defendant had taken positions in the litigation that were inconsistent
with those asserted in the written opinion. The court rejected the
defendant's assertion that positions presented pre-litigation were
consistent with those presented post-litigation, finding instead that the
inconsistency "directly calls into question the competence of
[defendant's] opinion of counsel and the reasonableness of its reliance
on an opinion from which Reilly may now be attempting to distance
itself.",
44
For documents created before the litigation was filed, the BASF
court followed the weight of established precedent and compelled
production of all attorney-client privileged documents regarding the
subject matter of the opinion letter.45 In contrast, the court compelled
production of pre-litigation work product only to the extent that such
information had been disclosed to the accused infringer, reasoning
that "the attorney's 'mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or
legal theories' are not relevant to the effort unless they were
communicated to the client."'46 BASF rejected the expansive view of
waiver adopted by a number of courts that compelled production of
all work product, rejecting the view that an attorney's private papers
were probative of the client's ability to rely on the attorney's advice.47
The most significant holdings of BASF concern post-litigation
material. In that regard, BASF compelled production of both
attorney-client privilege and work product information "to the extent
documents were communicated to defendants." 48 After reviewing the
conflicting lines of authority, the court ultimately compelled
production of post-litigation documents based on the facts presented.
Specifically, the court held that inconsistencies between the written
opinion of counsel and the defendant's litigation positions in the case
plaintiff needs to obtain sufficient information to test the competency and reasonableness of
reliance on the opinion, stating:
In the Court's view, it is critical for the patentee to have a full opportunity to
probe, not only the state of mind of the infringer, but also the mind of the
infringer's lawyer upon which the infringer so firmly relied. There is no reason
why the alleged infringer's waiver of the attomey-client privilege should not be
considered absolute, encompassing materials typically protected by the work
product doctrine.
Id. at 399.
44. BASF, 283 F. Supp. 2d at 1006-07.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1004-05.
47. Id. at 1005.
48. Id. at 1006.
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at bar justified broad disclosure of privileged and work product
material:
Contradictions contained in the opinion of counsel revealed in the
summary judgment briefs now before the Court compel this
result... Fairness dictates that the waiver extends post-suit once a
party relying on the advice-of-counsel defense changes or alters its
position as stated in the earlier advice-of-counsel opinion.
49
BASF went even further with respect to attorney-client
communications. Because the defendant had unsuccessfully
contended in opposing the motion to compel that no inconsistent
positions had been asserted, the court held that the waiver "must
necessarily extend to all such post-suit communications regarding the
subject matter of the opinion letter rather than just communications
that contradict or cast doubt on earlier opinions." 50 Otherwise, the
court reasoned, the defendant might insist that "no such
[contradictory] communications exist" and produce little
documentation as a result.5 1 Another significant aspect of BASF was
the court's determination that the fact that the defendant had engaged
the same counsel for the written opinion and the litigation was "not
outcome determinative., 52  In other words, the court gave no
deferential protection to work product of the opinion counsel who was
also acting as trial counsel in the case.53 BASF reasoned that the
defendant had "brought this problem on itself by choosing to retain
the same counsel to litigate this matter that gave the advice-of-counsel
opinion. 54
BASF underscores that the court's attention to the specifics of the
case influenced its findings on the scope of the waiver, here holding
that the defendant's inconsistencies in turn supported an inference
that counsel's work product contained contradictory and therefore
relevant information. Thus, a copy of the final opinion should be
provided to trial counsel so that the inconsistencies can be discovered
prior to the production of the opinion. Although in a typical case,
care should be taken to avoid such inconsistencies to preserve the
49. Id (citation omitted).
50. BASF, 283 F. Supp. 2d at 1007 n.5.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1004.
53. Id. at 1007. This is consistent with at least one other case, which characterized the
defendant's retention of counsel for both opinion and litigation work as an "unconventional and
risky arrangement." Novartis Pharms. Corp. v. Eon Labs Mfg., 206 F.R.D. 396, 399 (D. Del.
2002).
54. Id. at 1007.
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defense's credibility for trial, BASF further highlights that such
discrepancies can result in a relatively broad waiver of information
that might otherwise have been protected.
V. CONCLUSION
Despite the lack of harmony in court decisions regarding the
scope of the waiver of the attorney-client privilege and the attorney
work-product doctrines when an opinion of counsel defense is
asserted in response to a charge of willful infringement, it is evident
that by careful strategic planning, alleged infringers, may be able to
restrict the scope of waiver. Aspex Eyewear and BASF demonstrate
the significant consequences that decisions regarding opinion counsel
may have, decisions that may provide plaintiffs the opportunity to
obtain information and material that might otherwise remain
protected. Therefore, careful management is necessary to control the
scope of the waiver.

